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ABSTRACT
Electricity and Information Technology (IT) are perhaps the two most important general purpose
technologies (GPTs) to date. We analyze how the U.S. economy reacted to them. The Electricity and
IT eras are similar, but also differ in several important ways. Electrification was more broadly
adopted, whereas IT seems to be technologically more "revolutionary." The productivity slowdown
is stronger in the IT era but the ongoing spread of IT and its continuing precipitous price decline are
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Abstract
Electricity and Information Technology (IT) are perhaps the two most im-
portant general purpose technologies (GPTs) to date. We analyze how the
U.S. economy reacted to them. The Electricity and IT eras are similar, but
also diﬀer in several important ways. Electri￿cation was more broadly adopted,
whereas IT seems to be technologically more ￿revolutionary.￿ The productivity
slowdown is stronger in the IT era but the ongoing spread of IT and its con-
tinuing precipitous price decline are reasons for optimism about growth in the
21st century.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The term ￿general-purpose technology,￿ or GPT, has seen extensive use in recent
treatments of the role of technology in economic growth, and is usually reserved for
changes that transform both household life and the ways in which ￿rms conduct
business. Steam, electricity, internal combustion, and information technology (IT)
are often classi￿ed as GPTs for this reason. They aﬀected the whole economy.
As David (1991) has pointed out, however, a GPT does not deliver productivity
gains immediately upon arrival. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the growth in output
per man-hour in the U.S. economy over the past 130 years, with periods of rapid
diﬀusion of the two major GPTs shaded and the dashed line representing long-term
trends as generated with the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ￿lter.1 Productivity growth
was apparently quite rapid during the heyday of steam power (circa. 1870), but fell
∗This is a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Economic Growth, edited by Philippe Aghion
and Steven N. Durlauf. The authors thank the NSF for support, and Jason Cummins, Bart Hobijn,
Joshua Lerner and Gianluca Violante for providing us with some of the data used here.
1Output per man-hour in the business, non-farm sector is from John Kendrick￿s series as published
in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, Series D684, p. 162) for 1889-1947 and from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics for 1948-2003. For 1874-89, we use Kendrick￿s decadal averages for 1869-79 and
1879-89 and interpolate between these benchmarks assuming a constant growth rate from 1874-84
and 1885-89.














Figure 1: Annual growth in output per man-hour, 1874-2003.
as Electri￿cation arrived in the 1890s, with the de￿ning moment in the transition
probably being the startup of the ￿rst hydro-electric facility at Niagara Falls in 1894.
It was only in the period after 1915, which saw the diﬀusion of machines operated by
stand-alone secondary motors and the widespread establishment of centralized power
grids, that Electricity ￿nally pervaded businesses and households more generally and
measures of productivity began to rise.
Figure 1 also shows that the arrival of IT, which we date with Intel￿s invention in
1971 of the ￿4004￿ micro-processor (the key component of the personal computer or
￿PC￿), did not reverse the decline in productivity growth that had begun more than
a decade earlier. It seems only now that we are ￿nally seeing computers show up in
the productivity ￿gures.
But it is not obvious that the startup of the Niagara Falls dam and the invention
of the 4004 chip should de￿ne the birth of the two GPTs. After all, Thomas Edison
invented the incandescent bulb in 1879 and by 1882 the world￿s ￿rst large central
power station had been installed at Pearl Street in New York City, twelve years
before we mark Electricity￿s ￿arrival.￿ And large mainframe computers predicted the
winner of the 1952 U.S. Presidential election, nearly two decades prior to the advent
of the microprocessor. An objective measure is needed, though, and we shall de￿ne
2the start of a GPT-era as the point in time when the GPT has achieved a one-percent
diﬀusion in the median sector. This is another way to arrive at 1894 and 1971 as the
starting points where the shading begins in Figure 1. Similarly, we would say that
the era is over when the diﬀusion curve ￿attens out. For Electri￿cation, it takes until
about 1929 for net adoption to reach a plateau, whereas new adoption of IT is still
rising today so that, on that criterion, the IT epoch continues.
Each shaded area in Figure 1 contains a productivity-growth slowdown in its
i n i t i a lp h a s e s .W i l lt h eg r o w t hs l o w d o w no ft h ec u r r e n tI Te r ab ef o l l o w e db yar i s e
in growth in the ￿r s th a l fo ft h e2 1st century? If the second shaded area in Figure 1
is in some fundamental respects like the ￿rst shaded area, then we can expect growth
to pick up over the next several decades. In Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) we have
argued that the ￿r s th a l fo ft h e2 1st century will have higher growth than, say, the
1950s and 1960s. Gordon (2000), on the other hand, is pessimistic, arguing that IT
does not measure up to Electricity and that it will not have such positive results.
This chapter, while documenting key diﬀerences between the diﬀusion paths of the
two technologies, will in the end conclude that the two GPT-eras are strikingly similar
in a number of respects. If anything, our ￿nding that IT is the more ￿revolutionary￿
of the two GPTs suggests that its full impact is yet to be seen.
This chapter is organized around the presentation of a collection of facts. The
facts are described mainly through graphs and tables which provide evidence on a
set of models that we shall mention as we go along. A primarily analytic survey is
Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001).
1.1 What is a GPT?
So, what are these ￿fundamental￿ features of GPTs that would allow us to compare
one to another? And more generally, what criteria can one use to distinguish a GPT
from other technologies? Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1996) argue that a GPT should
have the following three characteristics:
1. Pervasiveness: The GPT should spread to most sectors.
2. Improvement: The GPT should get better over time and, hence, should keep
lowering the costs of its users.
3. Innovation spawning: The GPT should make it easier to invent and produce
new products or processes.
Most technologies possess each of these characteristics to some degree, and thus
a GPT cannot diﬀer qualitatively from these other technologies. Note, too, that the
third property is, in a sense, a version of the ￿rst property if we phrase the latter to
say that the GPT should also spread to the innovation sector. Moreover, this list can
be expanded to include more subtle features of GPTs, a subject that we consider in
3Section 3. Yet we ￿nd these three basic characteristics to be a useful starting point
for evaluating and comparing the impact of various technologies through history.
Investigating how Electricity and IT measure up on these three dimensions is the
focus of Section 2. But ￿rst, we summarize our overall ￿ndings.
1.2 Summary of ￿ndings
The evidence shows similarities and diﬀerences between the Electri￿cation and the IT
eras. Electri￿cation was more pervasive (#1), whereas IT has a clear lead in terms
of improvement (#2) and innovation spawning (#3). Let us list the similarities and
diﬀerences in more detail.
1.2.1 Similarities between the Electri￿cation and IT eras
1. In both eras productivity growth rates are below those attained in the decades
immediately preceding the GPT￿s arrival.
2. Measures of reallocation and invention ￿ the entry and exit of ￿rms to the stock
market, investment by new ￿rms relative to incumbents, and grants of patents
and trademarks ￿ are all higher during the GPT-eras.
3. Private consumption rises gradually during each GPT-era.
4. Real interest rates are about the same during the two GPT-eras, and about
three percentage points higher than from 1930 to 1970 ￿ the period between
the rapid adoptions of Electricity and IT.
1.2.2 Diﬀerences between the Electri￿cation and IT eras
1. Innovation measures are growing much faster for IT than for Electri￿cation ￿
patents and trademarks surge much more strongly during the IT era, and the
price of IT is falling 100 times faster, at least, than did the price of electricity.
2. IT is spreading more slowly than did Electri￿cation, and it comprises a smaller
part of the capital stock. Its net adoption continues to rise in the United States.
3. The productivity slowdown is stronger in the IT era.
4. No comparable sudden collapse of the stock market occurred early on in the
Electri￿cation era.
5. The Electri￿cation era saw a surplus in the U.S. trade balance, in part because
Europe had to ￿nance a string of wars, whereas the IT era ￿nds the United
States with consistent trade de￿cits.
4The diﬀerences seem to be quite important. But overall the evidence clearly sup-
ports the view that technological progress is uneven, that it does entail the episodic
arrival of GPTs, that these GPTs bring on turbulence and lower growth early on and
higher growth and prosperity later. The bottom line is that with a wider body of
data and ￿fteen more years of it than David (1991) had at his disposal, we con￿rm
his hypothesis that Electri￿cation and IT adoption are manifestations of the same
force at work, namely the introduction of a GPT.
2 Measuring the three characteristics of a GPT
As suggested in Figure 1, we shall choose Electricity and IT as our candidate GPTs,
and the measures that we construct will pertain mostly to these two technologies. In
passing, we shall also touch upon steam and internal combustion. The three subsec-
tions below report, in turn, various measures of each characteristic ￿ pervasiveness,
improvement, and innovation ￿ for the two GPTs at hand.
2.1 Pervasiveness of the GPT
The ￿rst characteristic is the technology￿s pervasiveness. We begin by looking at
aggregates and proceed to consider individual industrial sectors in more detail.
2.1.1 Pervasiveness in the aggregate
Ideally we would like to track the evolution of various candidate GPTs using con-
tinuous time series from about 1850 to the present, but we do not have data that
consistently cover this entire stretch of time, and thus will need to work with two
overlapping segments: 1869-1954 and 1947-2003.
Figure 2 shows the shares of total horsepower in manufacturing by power source
from 1869 to 1954.2 The period covers the decline in usage of water wheels and
turbines, the rise and fall of steam engines and turbines, the rise and gradual ￿attening
out of the internal combustion engine￿s use in industrial applications, and the sharp
rise in the use of primary and secondary electric motors. The symmetry of the
plot is striking in that, with the exception of internal combustion, power-generating
technologies seem to have led for the most part sequential existences. The relative
brevity of the entire steam cycle, which rises and falls within a period of 50-60 years,
suggests that the technology which replaced it, Electricity, was important enough to
2We construct the shares of total horsepower in manufacturing as ratios of each power source
from DuBoﬀ (1964, table 14, p. 59) to the total (table 13, p. 58). DuBoﬀ estimates these quantities
in 1869, 1879, 1889, 1899, 1904, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1939, and 1954, and we
linearly interpolate between these years in Figure 2. This source does not include a breakdown of
non-electrical capacity (i.e., water, internal combustion, and steam) after 1939, and so we mark the
more broadly-de￿ned ￿non-electrical￿ share for 19 5 4w i t ha na s t e r i s k .
















Figure 2: Shares of total horsepower generated by the main sources in U.S. manufac-
turing, 1869-1954.
force a rapid transition among manufacturers. In contrast, the decline of water power
was more gradual.
If we could continue Figure 2 to the present, Electricity would surely still command
a very high share of manufacturing power as the next new source (e.g., solar power?)
has not yet emerged to replace it. The persistence of Electricity as the primary power
source, even though its diﬀusion throughout the manufacturing sector was complete
decades ago, helps to identify it as one of the breakthrough technologies of the modern
era.
Figure 3 shows the diﬀusion of computers in the U.S. industrial sector as measured
by the share of IT equipment and software in the aggregate capital stock.3 Computer
and software purchases appear to have reached the ￿rst in￿ection point in their "S-
curve" more slowly than Electri￿cation in the early years of its adoption, but it is
3We build the ratio plotted in Figure 3 for 1961 to 2001 by summing the capital stocks of 62
SIC industrial sectors from the detailed non-residential ￿xed asset tables in constant 1996 dollars
made available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2002, 2004). IT capital includes mainframe
and personal computers, storage devices, printers, terminals, integrated systems, and pre-packaged,
custom, and own-account software. The total capital stock is the sum of all ￿xed asset types.












Figure 3: Shares of computer equipment and software in the aggregate capital stock,
1960-2003.
striking how much faster the IT share has risen over the past few years. Moreover,
while the diﬀu s i o no fE l e c t r i c i t yh a ds l o w e dd o w nb y1930, the year which we mark
as the end of the Electri￿cation era, computer and software sales continue their rapid
rise to this day.
The vertical axes in Figures 2 and 3 are scaled diﬀerently. In Figure 2 the vertical
axis measures the share of total horsepower in manufacturing, whereas in Figure 3 it
is the share of IT equipment and software in the aggregate capital stock. But scaling
aside, a comparison of the shape of the diﬀusions in the two ￿gures suggests that
the IT-adoption era will last longer than the 35 years of Electri￿cation. Indeed, the
acceleration in adoption, which was over by about 1905 for Electri￿cation, did not end
until about 1997 for IT. It also appears that IT forms a smaller part of the physical
capital stock than did electric-powered machinery at the corresponding stages.
Why did Electricity spread faster than IT seems to be doing? Both technologies
are subject to a network externality; Electricity because the connecting of cables and
wires to a neighborhood was more pro￿table when the number of users was larger, and
IT especially so after the internet was invented. Perhaps electrical technologies were























Figure 4: Shares of electri￿ed horsepower by manufacturing sector, 1890-1954.
more pro￿table, or perhaps the rapid price decline of computers and peripherals makes
it optimal to wait and adopt later as Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) emphasize.
2.1.2 Pervasiveness among sectors
Cummins and Violante (2002, p. 245) classify a technology as a GPT when the
share of new capital associated with it reaches a critical level, and if adoption is
widespread across industries. Electri￿cation seems to ￿t this description. Figure 4
shows the shares of total horsepower electri￿ed in manufacturing sectors at ten-year
intervals from 1889 to 1954.4 Electrical adoption was very rapid between 1899 and
1919 but slowed considerably thereafter, with the dispersion in the adoption rates
largest around 1919.
The striking feature of Figure 4 is how uniformly electrical technology aﬀected
individual manufacturing sectors. Table 1, which shows the rank correlations of
Electricity shares across sectors and time, indicates that there was little change in
the relative ordering of the sectors. This means that the sectors that were the heaviest
4The shares of electri￿ed horsepower include primary and secondary electric motors, and are
computed using data from DuBoﬀ (1964, tables E-11 and E-12a through E-12e, pp. 228-235).
8users of Electricity in 1890 remained among the leaders as adoption slowed down in
the 1930s. In sum, the adoption of Electricity was sweeping and widespread.
Why did that adoption take as long as it did? One answer is that it was costly to
set up the wiring required to electrify households early on. This is apparent from the
peculiar two-stage adoption process that many factories chose in adopting Electricity.
Located to a large extent in New England factory towns, textile ￿rms around the start
of the 20th century readily adapted the new technology by using an electric motor
rather than steam to drive the shafts which powered looms, spinning machines and
other equipment [see Devine (1983)]. Moreover, delays in the distribution of electricity
made it more costly to electrify a new industrial plant fully.
Table 1
Rank correlations of Electricity shares in total horsepower
by manufacturing sector, 1889-1954
1889 1899 1909 1919 1929 1939 1954
1889 1.000
1899 0.707 1.000
1909 0.643 0.918 1.000
1919 0.686 0.746 0.893 1.000
1929 0.639 0.718 0.739 0.8711 .000
1939 0.486 0.507 0.571 0.750 0.807 1.000
1954 0.804 0.696 0.650 0.789 0.893 0.729 1.000
Figure 5 shows the same data as Figure 4, but now in percentile form. We build
it by sorting the Electricity shares in each year and, given that only 15s e c t o r sa r e
represented, plotting the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 11th and 14th largest shares in each year.
The percentile diﬀusion curves will be useful when drawing comparisons with the IT
era. They also help us in dating Electricity as a GPT. Linear extrapolation between
the years 1890 and 1900 suggests that in 1894, about one percent of horsepower in
the median industry was provided by Electricity. Whether or not this is actually the
￿right￿ percentage for dating the start of the Electri￿cation era, we shall use a one
percent share for the median industry to date the beginning of the IT era as well.
This provides a common standard for choosing the left-end points of the two shaded
areas.
In the century before the Electricity revolution, the technology that primarily
drove manufacturing was steam. Figure 6 shows just how slowly steam was replaced
between 1899 and 1939.5 It is natural that industries such as rubber, primary metals,
5The sectoral shares of manufacturing horsepower driven by steam were computed from DuBoﬀ
(1964, tables E-12a through E-12e, pp. 229-233), and include steam engines and turbines. These
shares are available on a decade basis from 1899 until 19 3 9o n l y ,w h i c hi sw h yt h et i m ec o v e r a g ei n
Figure 6 is shorter than that in Figure 4.













Figure 5: Shares of electri￿ed horsepower by manufacturing sector in percentiles,
1890-1954.
non-electric machinery, and stone, clay, and glass, which saw such rapid increases
in electricity use over the same period, would withdraw from steam most rapidly.
Indeed, most of the industries that quickly switched over to electricity had been
heavy users of steam. This is clear from Figures 4 and 6, taken together, and from
the rank correlations of steam shares in total horsepower in Table 2 which decay
quickly and suggest a non-uniformity in the destruction of steam technology across
the manufacturing sectors.
Table 2
Rank correlations of steam shares in total horsepower
by manufacturing sector, 1889-1954
1899 1909 1919 1929 1939
1899 1.000
1909 0.825 1.000
1919 0.604 0.800 1.000
1929 0.525 0.604 0.832 1.000
1939 0.261 0.282 0.496 0.775 1.000























Figure 6: Shares of steam-driven horsepower by manufacturing sector, 1899-1939.
The spread of IT was also rapid, but does not appear to have been as widespread
as Electricity. Figure 7 shows the share of IT equipment and software in the net
capital stocks of 62 sectors from 1960 to 2001 plotted as annual percentiles.6 Some
sectors adopted IT very rapidly, and by 1975 six of them (the 90th percentile) had
already achieved IT equipment and software shares of more than 5 percent. Other
sectors lagged behind, and some did not adopt IT in a substantive way until after
1985.
On the other hand, the rank correlations of the IT shares across sectors, shown
in Table 3, are even higher than those obtained for Electri￿cation. On the face of it
then, Electri￿cation would appear to have been the more sweeping GPT-type event
because it diﬀused more rapidly in the U.S. economy and all sectors adopted it pretty
much at the same time, whereas IT diﬀused rapidly in some sectors and not-so-rapidly
in others. Nonetheless, the recent gains in IT shares show that the diﬀusion of this
6The sectoral capital stocks are from the detailed non-residential ￿xed asset tables in constant
1996 dollars made available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2002). We present the sectoral
shares for the IT era in percentile form because the number of sectors covered is much larger than
was possible for electri￿cation and steam. Changes in the industrial classi￿cations and the level of
detail provided in the BEA￿s publicly-available ￿xed asset tables require us to end the series in 2001.












Figure 7: Shares of IT equipment and software in the capital stock by sector in
percentiles, 1960-2001.
Table 3
Rank correlations of IT shares in capital stocks
by sector, 1961-2001
19611 9711 9811 991 2001
19611 .000
1971 0.650 1.000
1981 0.531 0.806 1.000
1991 0.576 0.746 0.847 1.000
2001 0.559 0.682 0.734 0.909 1.000
GPT has yet to slow down in the way that Electri￿cation did after 1929.
So far we have discussed adoption by ￿rms, and have used this concept to deter-
mine the dating of the two GPT-epochs. We turn to households next.
12Years following "arrival"






















Figure 8: Percent of households with electric service and personal computers during
the two GPT-eras.
2.1.3 Adoption by households
Households also underwent electri￿cation and the purchase of PCs for home use dur-
ing the respective GPT-eras. Figure 8 shows the cumulative percentage of households
that had obtained electric service and that owned a PC in each year following the
arrival of the GPT.7 If we continue to date Electricity as arriving in 1894 and the
PC in 1971, Figure 8 shows that households adopted Electricity about as rapidly as
they are adopting the PC. By the time the technology was oﬃcially 35 years old (in
1929), nearly 70 percent of households had electrical connections. A comparison with
Figure 5 shows that this is just a little higher than the 1929 penetration of electri￿ed
horsepower as measured by its share in the median manufacturing sector. As in the
case of ￿rms, the electri￿cation of households reaches a plateau in 1929, although it
resumed its rise a few years later. On the other hand, there is no sign yet that the
7Data on the spread of electricity use by consumers are approximations derived from U.S. Bureau
of the Census (1975) Historical Statistics of the United States (series S108 and S120). Statistics
on computer ownership for 1975 through 1998 are from Gates (1999, p. 118), and from the Census
Bureau￿s Current Population Survey thereafter.
13diﬀusion of the computer among either households or ￿r m si ss l o w i n gd o w n .
With households, as with ￿rms, diﬀusion lags seem to arise for diﬀerent reasons
for the two technologies. Rural areas were diﬃcult for Electricity to reach, but this
is not the case for the PC, where the main barrier is probably the cost of learning
how to use it. This barrier seems to have more to do with human capital than was
the case with Electricity.
In some ways it is puzzling that the diﬀu s i o no ft h eP Ch a sn o tb e e nm u c hf a s t e r
than that of Electricity. The price of computing capacity is falling much faster than
the price of electricity did. Aﬀordable PCs came out in the 1980s, when the technology
was some 15 years old. On the other hand, households had to wait longer for aﬀordable
electrical appliances. Only after 1915, when secondary motors begin to diﬀuse widely
and electrical appliances began to be invented, did the bene￿ts of Electri￿cation
outweigh the costs for a majority of households. Greenwood, Shesadri and Yorukoglu
(2002) document the spread of electrically-powered household appliances and argue
that their diﬀusion helped to raise female labor-force participation by freeing up their
time from housework.
2.1.4 On dating the endpoints of a GPT-era
Our dating procedure re￿ects net adoption rates by ￿rms, but the dates would not
change much if we had instead used net adoption by households. The shaded areas are
periods when the S-shaped adoption curves are, for the most part, rising. Whether or
not they start to fall later should not aﬀect the designated adoption eras. For instance,
Electricity has not yet been replaced in the same way that steam was phased out in
the ￿rst half of the 20th century, but the Electri￿cation era still ends in 1930 because
adoption as measured in Figures 2, 4, and 5 ￿attens out. Figures 2 and 6 show that
the steam era must have ended sometime around 1899 because net adoption had
already become negative.
Net adoption is endogenous and should re￿ect the pro￿tability of the technology
at hand compared to that of other technologies. The Niagara Falls dam in 1894 and
the development of alternating current made it possible to produce and distribute
electricity more cheaply at greater distances. Figures 4 and 5 show that at the
outset, some sectors (like printing) raced ahead of others in terms of how quickly they
adopted. Later on, as the technology matures, its adoption becomes more universal.
Eventually, the lagging sectors tend to catch up a bit, in relative terms, but not
completely. Inequality of adoption is highest in the middle of the adoption era. We
also see such a temporary rise in inequality among the declining steam shares (Figure
6) at about the same time that inequality was greatest in Electricity adoption.








Figure 9: The price of equipment relative to consumption goods.
2.2 Improvement of the GPT
The second characteristic that Bresnahan and Trajtenberg suggested is improvement
in the eﬃciency of the GPT as it ages. Presumably this would show up in a decline
in prices, an increase in quality, or both. How much a GPT improves can therefore
be measured by how much cheaper a unit of quality gets over time. If technology is
embodied in capital, then presumably capital as a whole should be getting cheaper
faster during a GPT-era, but especially capital that is tied to the new technology.
To investigate these implications, we ￿rst look at the price of capital goods gen-
erally and then at the prices of capital￿s components. Figure 9 is a quality-adjusted
series for the relative price of equipment as a whole, pk/pc (i.e., relative to the con-
sumption price index) since 1885, constructed from a number of sources with a linear
time trend included.8 The ￿gure shows that equipment prices declined most sharply
8Krusell et al. (2000) build such a series from 1963 using the consumer price index to de￿ate
quality-adjusted estimates of producer equipment prices from Gordon (1990, table 12.4, col. 2, p.
541). Since Gordon￿s series ends in 1983, they use VAR forecasts to extend it through 1992. We start
with Krusell et al. and work backward, de￿ating Gordon￿s remaining estimates (1947-62) with an
index for non-durable consumption goods prices that we derive from the National Income Accounts.


















Figure 10: Price indices for products of the two GPT-eras.
between 1905 and 1920, and again after 1975. The 1905-20 period is also the one that
showed the most rapid growth of Electricity in manufacturing (see Figure 4) and in
t h eh o m e( s e eF i g u r e8 ) .T h ep o s t - 1975 period follows the introduction of the PC.
Figure 10 considers the prices of components of the capital stock that are tied to
our candidate GPTs (as well as to internal combustion), with all prices relative to the
aggregate CPI. We use the price of electricity itself because de￿ators for electrically-
powered capital are not available for the ￿r s th a l fo ft h e2 0 t hc e n t u r y . 9 Declines
Since we are not aware of a quality-adjusted series for equipment prices prior to 1947, we use the
average price of electricity as a proxy for 1902-46, and an average of Brady￿s (1966) de￿ators for
the main classes of equipment for 1885-1902. We de￿ate the pre-19 4 7c o m p o s i t eu s i n gt h eB u r e a u
of Labor Statistics (BLS) consumer price index of all items [U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, series
E135)] for 1913-46 and the Burgess cost of living index [U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, series
E184)] for 1885-1912.
9Electricity prices are averages of all electric services in cents per kilowatt hour from U.S. Bureau
of the Census (1975, series S119, p. 827) for 1903, 1907, 1917, 1922, and 1926-70, and from various
issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United States for 1971-89. We interpolate under a constant
growth assumption between the missing years in the early part of the sample. For 1990-2000, prices
are U.S. city averages (June ￿gures) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http:www.bls.gov). We
then set the index to equal 1000 in the ￿rst year of the sample (i.e., 1903).
16in motor vehicle prices should capture the improvement in internal combustion as a
possible GPT.10 The use of the left-hand scale for electricity and motor vehicles and
the right-hand scale for computers underscores the extraordinary decline in computer
prices since 1960 compared to the earlier technologies.11 While the relative prices of
electricity and motor vehicles fall by a factor of 10, the index of relative computer
prices falls by a factor of 10,000.
The more interesting question, however, is how the general decline in equipment
prices relates to the declines associated more directly with the GPTs of each epoch.
Figure 11 makes this comparison by plotting the relative prices of all three GPTs
along with the general equipment price index on the same logarithmic scale, with the
starting point for each of the GPTs normalized to the level of the general equipment
index in that year. By this measure, it is clear that electricity and motor vehicle
prices declined at about the same pace as that of equipment generally until the start
of the IT price data, though it is also interesting that motor vehicle prices appear to
have declined faster than electricity prices. After 1960, declining computer prices and
rising shares of computers in equipment stocks seem to have drawn the general index
downward, while computing prices fell thousands of times faster than the general
index.
It can be said that the Electricity index, being the price of a kilowatt-hour, un-
derstates the accompanying technological change because it does not account for
improvements in electrical equipment, and especially improvements in the eﬃciency
of electrical motors. Such improvements may be contained in the price series for
capital generally. But based on the price evidence in Figures 10a n d11, electricity,
motor vehicles, and computers might all qualify as GPTs. Computers, however, are
clearly the most revolutionary of the three.
10Motor vehicle prices for 1913-40 are annual averages of monthly wholesale prices of passenger
vehicles from the National Bureau of Economic Research (Macrohistory Database, series m04180a
for 1913-27, series m04180b for 1928-40, http://www.nber.org). From 1941-47, they are wholesale
prices of motor vehicles and equipment from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, series E38, p. 199),
and from 1948-2000 they are producer prices of motor vehicles from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(http://www.bls.gov). To approximate prices from 1901-1913, we extrapolate backward assuming
constant growth and the average annual growth rate observed from 1913-24. We then join the
various components to form an overall price index and set it to equal 1000 in the ￿rst year of the
sample (i.e., 1901).
11To construct a quality-adjusted price index, we join the ￿￿nal￿ price index for computer systems
from Gordon (1990, table 6.10, col. 5, p. 226) for 1960-78 with the pooled index developed for
desktop and mobile PCs by Berndt, Dulberger, and Rappaport (2000, table 2, col. 1,p . 2 2 )
for 1979-99. Since Gordon￿s index includes mainframe computers, minicomputers, and PCs while
the Berndt et al. index includes only PCs, the two segments used to build our price measure are
themselves not directly comparable, but a joining of them should still re￿ect quality-adjusted prices
trends in the computer industry reasonably well. We set the index to 1000 in the ￿rst year of the
sample (i.e., 1960).













Figure 11: Comparison of the decline in general and GPT-speci￿c equipment prices.
2.3 Ability of the GPT to spawn innovation
The third characteristic that Bresnahan and Trajtenberg suggested was the technol-
ogy￿s ability to generate innovation. Any GPT will aﬀect all sorts of production
processes, including those for invention and innovation. Some GPTs will be biased
towards helping to produce existing products, others towards inventing and imple-
menting new ones. An example of a more speci￿c technology that was heavily skewed
towards future products was hybrid corn. Griliches (1957, p. 502) explains why hy-
brid corn was not an invention immediately adaptable everywhere, but was rather an
invention of a method of inventing, a method of breeding superior corn for speci￿c
localities.
Electricity and IT have both helped reduce costs of making existing products, and
they both spawn innovation, but IT seems to have more of a skew towards the latter.
There is no doubt that the 1920s, especially, also saw a wave a new products powered
by electricity, but as the patenting evidence will bear out, the IT era has seen an
unprecedented increase in inventive activity. For example, the role of the computer
in simulation should be known to many of us writing research papers. Feder (1988)
describes how computers play a similar role in the invention of new drugs.












Figure 12: Patents issued on inventions and trademarks registered in the United
States per million persons, 1790-2002.
2.3.1 Patenting
Patenting should be more intense after a GPT arrives and while it is spreading due
to the introduction of related new products. Figure 12, which shows the numbers of
patents issued per capita on inventions annually from 1790 to 2002 and trademarks
registered from 1870 to 2002, shows two surges in activity ￿ between 1900 and 1930,
and again after 1977.12 Is it mere chance that patenting activity was most intense
during our GPT-eras? Moreover, it appears that patenting activity picks up after the
end of the U.S. Civil War in 1865, and again at the conclusion of World War II in
12We use the total number ￿utility￿ (i.e., invention) patents from the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce for 1963-2002, and from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, series W-96, pp. 957-959) for
1790-1962. The number of registered trademarks are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975,
series W-107, p. 959) for 1870-1969, and from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United
States for later years. Population ￿gures, which are for the total resident population and measured
at mid-year, are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, series A-7, p. 8) for 1790-1970, and from
the Census Bureau￿s web site thereafter.
191945. The slowdown in patenting during the wars and the acceleration immediately
thereafter suggest that there may be some degree of intertemporal substitution in the
release of new ideas away from times when it might be more diﬃcult to popularize
them and towards times better suited for the entry of new products.
Does the surge in patenting re￿ect a rise in the number of actual inventions, or
was the surge prompted by changes in the law that raised the propensity to patent?
This question is important because, over longer periods of time, patents may re￿ect
policy rather than invention. Figure 13 analyzes data described in Lerner (2002) and
shows that worldwide, changes in patent policy are correlated with the patent series
in Figure 12. It is possible, therefore, that the U.S. series re￿ects the stance of the
courts regarding enforcement. Kortum and Lerner (1998) analyze this question and
found that the surge of the 1990s was worldwide, but not systematically related to
country-speci￿c policy changes. They conclude that technology was the cause for the
surge.
Further support for this view comes from the behavior of trademarks per capita,
which we also plot in Figure 12. Trademarks behave more or less the same as patents
do, except for their more sharply rising trend. Trademarks are easier to obtain
than patents and are not governed by legal developments concerning patents. But
with trademarks we have a diﬀerent concern: Do trademarks proxy for the number of
products, or do they just measure duplicative activity and the amount of competition?
The answer may depend on what market one looks at. In the market for bananas,
for example, Wiggins and Raboy (1996) ￿nd that brand names are correlated with
measures of quality that do explain price variation, suggesting that brand names do
signify product diﬀerentiation.
2.3.2 Investment by new ￿rms vs. investment by incumbents
New ￿rms do not have costs sunk in old technologies and they are more ￿exible orga-
nizationally than existing ￿rms. One should therefore expect to see job-reallocation
waves and waves of entry and exit during the GPT-eras. One measure of entry is the
extent of new listings on the stock exchange. Figure 14 shows the value of ￿rms enter-
ing the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
and NASDAQ in each year from 1885 through 2003 as percentages of total stock
market value.13 As predicted by Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a, 1998b), initial
13T h ed a t au s e dt oc o n s t r u c tF i g u r e14 and others in this chapter that use stock market valuations
are from the University of Chicago￿s Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) ￿les for 1925-
2003. NYSE ￿rms are available in CRSP continuously, AMEX ￿rms after 1961, and NASDAQ ￿rms
after 1971. We extended the CRSP stock ￿les backward from their 1925 starting year by collecting
year-end observations from 1885 to 19 2 5f o ra l lc o m m o ns t o c k st r a d e do nt h eN Y S E .P r i c e sa n dp a r
values are from the The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, which is also the source of ￿rm-level
data for the price indices reported in the in￿uential study by Cowles et al. (1939). We obtained
￿rm-level book capitalizations from Bradstreet￿s, The New York Times,a n dThe Annalist.T h e
resulting dataset, which includes 25,319 ￿rms, complements others that have begun to build a more











Figure 13: Indices of worldwide changes in patent laws.
public oﬀerings (IPOs) surge between 1895 and 1929, and then after 1977, which
again closely matches the dating of our two GPT-eras.
The dashed line in Figure 14i sp r i v a t ei n v e s t m e n ts i n c e1870 as a percent of
the net stock of private capital in the U.S. economy as a whole, and as such is the
aggregate analog of the solid line that covers only the stock market.14 The solid line
complete view of securities prices for the pre-CRSP period [see, for example, Rousseau (1999) on
Boston￿s 19th century equity market].
14T ob u i l dt h ei n v e s t m e n tr a t es e r i e s ,w es t a r tw i t hg r o s sp r i v a t ed o m e s t i ci n v e s t m e n ti nc u r r e n t
dollars from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) for 1929-2003 and then join it with the gross
capital formation series in current dollars, excluding military expenditures, from Kuznets (1961b,
Tables T-8 and T-8a) for 1870-1929. We construct the net capital stock using the private ￿xed
assets tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) for 1925-2003. Then, using the estimates
of the net stock of non-military capital from Kuznets (1961a, Table 3, pp. 64-5) in 1869, 1879,
1889, 1909, 1919, and 1929 as benchmarks, we use the percent changes in a synthetic series for the
capital stock formed by starting with the 1869 Kuznets (1961a) estimate of $27 billion and adding
net capital formation in each year through 1929 from Kuznets (1961b) to create an annual series
that runs through the benchmark points. Finally, we join the resulting series for 1870-1925 to the
later BEA series. The investment rate that appears in Figure 14i st h er a t i oo fo u r￿nal investment
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Figure 14: IPOs as a percent of stock market value, and private domestic investment
as a percent of the net capital stock, 1870-2003.
in Figure 15 shows the ratio of the solid and dashed lines in Figure 14. In both ￿gures
it is clear that, during the Electri￿cation epoch, investment by stock market entrants
accounted for a larger portion of stock market value than overall new investment in
the U.S. economy contributed to the aggregate capital stock. This is consistent with
the adoption of Electricity favoring the unencumbered entrant over the incumbent,
who may have incurred substantial adjustment costs in using the new technology.
We say this because aggregate investment, while indeed including new ￿rms, has an
even larger component attributable to incumbents. Moreover, the solid line in Figure
15 was highest in the early years of the Electri￿cation period, which is when these
adjustment costs would have been greatest.
Although the solid line in Figure 15 has so far stayed below unity for most of the
IT-era, it has rapidly risen to a higher level in recent years. This could be because
IT adoption involved very large adjustment costs for both incumbents and entrants
in the early years until the price of equipment and software fell enough to generate a
wave of adoptions by new ￿rms.
series to the capital stock series, expressed as a percentage.























Figure 15: Other investment ratios, 1885-2003.
The solid line in Figure 15 shows a downward trend mainly because the stock
market became more important as a vehicle for corporate ￿nancing among industrial
￿rms in the early part of the 20th century. IPOs are normalized by total stock
market value, which was small early on, and has since become larger. The dotted line
in Figure 15 shows the ratio of the dollar values of IPOs and aggregate investment.
It is upward sloping for the same reason: IPOs were not that important early on
because the stock market was small. After 1970, IPOs capture a much larger share
of investment by new entrants than they did before World War I, for example, and
even a larger fraction than in the 1920s. When we consider both lines together, we
do get the impression that new ￿rms invest more during the GPT-eras than at other
times.
Does the distribution of entries across sectors shed light on the role of technological
factors in the entry waves? Perhaps so. Figure 16 is a scatterplot of the share of IPOs
in the market capitalizations of 15 manufacturing sectors between 1890 and 1930 vs.
their respective shares of horsepower driven by electricity in 1929.15 In other words,
15We compute the IPO shares by summing year-end IPO values by sector for 1890 through 1930,
converting the annual totals for each sector into real terms using the implicit price de￿ator for GDP,
23Share of h.p. driven by electricity























Y = 0.052 + 0.092 X, R
2 = 0.03 
(0.5)     (0.6) 
Figure 16: Scatterplot of IPOs as shares of sector value, 1890-1930 vs. shares of
horsepower electri￿ed in 1929.
we ask whether sectors with more IPOs ended up adopting the new technology more
vigorously than sectors with less entry. The regression line plotted in Figure 16h a s
a positive slope coeﬃcient, though with only 15 observations it is not statistically
signi￿cant.
In Figure 17, we regress IPOs over the 1971-2001 period on shares of computers
and peripherals in equipment investment in 2000, and once again obtain a sectoral
scatter with a positive slope coeﬃcient, though like our result for the Electri￿cation
era, it is not statistically signi￿cant.
3O t h e r s y m p t o m s o f a G P T
So far we have provided some measures of the three qualities of a GPT ￿ its per-
vasiveness, its rate of improvement, and its innovation-spawning tendency. Now we
and then summing across years. We do the same for all listed ￿rms by sector, and use the ratio of
sectoral IPO values to total sector capitalization to compute the shares shown in Figure 16.
24Share of IT in equipment investment










Y = 0.036 + 0.131 X, R
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insurance agents and brokers
Figure 17: Scatterplot of IPOs as shares of sector value, 1971-2001 vs. shares of IT
in equipment investment in 2000.
turn to less direct measures as suggested by various theoretical models that deal with
GPTs. These models predict the following symptoms:
1. Productivity should slow down.￿The new technology may not be user-friendly
at ￿rst, and output may fall for a while as the economy adjusts.
2. The skill premium should rise.￿If the GPT is not user-friendly at ￿rst, skilled
people will be in greater demand when the new technology arrives and their
earnings should rise compared to those of the unskilled.
3. Entry, exit and mergers should rise.￿These are alternative modes for the real-
location of assets.
4. Stock prices should initially fall.￿The value of old capital should fall. How fast
it falls depends on the way that the market learns of the GPT￿s arrival.
5. Young and small ￿r m ss h o u l dd ob e t t e r .￿The ideas and products associated
with the GPT will often be brought to market by new ￿rms. The market share
and market value of young ￿rms should therefore rise relative to old ￿rms.
256. Interest rates and the trade de￿cit.￿The rise in desired consumption relative
to output should cause interest rates to rise or the trade balance to worsen.
These, roughly speaking, are the hypotheses that emerge from the theoretical
work on GPTs. Now we examine each empirically in turn, and as we go through the
facts, we shall mention some of the relevant theories.
3.1 Productivity slowdown
As Bahk and Gort (1993) show, even in routine activities, learning seems to cause
delays of several years before plant productivity peaks. It is far from settled, however,
whether IT is the reason for the productivity slowdown ￿ Bessen (2002) ￿nds that
IT did cause a big part of the slowdown, whereas Comin (2002) argues the opposite.
It is also not yet de￿nitely known from the work of Caballero and Hammour (1994)
and others whether recessions at business-cycle frequencies are episodes of heightened
reallocation. At any rate, the theoretical models of Atkeson and Kehoe (1993), Horn-
stein and Krusell (1996), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Greenwood and Yorukoglu
(1997) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) emphasize various adjustment costs and
learning delays that may cause output to fall at ￿rst when a GPT arrives. David
(1991) argues that the speed with which a new technology diﬀuses depends on the
pool of investment opportunities that are available when it arrives, and remarks that
the quality of this pool in the late 1960s was low because a large backlog from the
post-war period had just and ￿nally been eliminated. He also points out that there
can often be ￿slippage￿ between the technological frontier and implementation due
to high input costs and the slow introduction of complementary products.
Figure 1 shows that productivity did not rise quickly in the early phases of the
two GPTs, though there is some evidence of greater productivity between 1918a n d
1929 and after 1997 or so. Productivity was high in the early years of the Electri￿-
cation period but fell rapidly as the technology matured. It stayed low through the
Depression and 1940s, and then rose rapidly before the IT-age arrived. This pattern
is consistent with David￿s view of exhausted investment opportunities. And while it
is interesting to consider the productivity slowdown after 1971,i ti sa l s oi m p o r t a n t
to recognize that productivity is considerably higher today than it was before IT￿s
arrival.
3.2 The skill premium
As Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Griliches (1969) argued, and Bartel and Lichtenberg
(1987) and Krusell et al. (2000) have con￿rmed, new technology should raise the
relative earnings of the skilled. Figure 18 presents a series for the earnings of skilled
relative to unskilled labor. We construct the series by combining estimates of the wage
ratio for urban skilled and unskilled workers for 1870-94 from Williamson and Lindert
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Figure 18: The skill premium.
(1980, p. 307) with estimates of the ratio of clerical to manufacturing production
wages for 1895-1938 and the returns to 16v e r s u s12 years of schooling for men for
1939-95 from Goldin and Katz (1999b).16
Although interpreting time series patterns in a continuous series formed from such
disparate sources must be done with caution, we note that the series does have a U-
shape, with the skill premium high in the early stages of Electri￿cation (i.e., 1890 to
1918) and then rising rapidly during the post-1978 part of the IT epoch. We suspect
that the decline in the skill premium from 1918-24 would have been less deep, and
thus the overall U-shape of Figure 18 more apparent, had it not been for the rapid
rise of the public higher-education system after the end of World War I [see Goldin
and Katz (1999a, p. 10)].
16Combining several very diﬀerent series into a continuous ￿skill premium￿ is necessary due to
sectoral shifts in the skilled and unskilled labor forces that render some measures of skill more
applicable to certain periods than others. For example, a college education appears to have become
a more important determinant of income in the postwar period than it was in earlier years. Since
the observations from Goldin and Katz (1999b) are generally decadal, we interpolate between them
to obtain an annual series for 1895 to 1995. The vertical dotted lines in Figure 18m a r kt h ep o i n t s
where we need to change data sources.
273.3 Entry, exit, and mergers should rise
Gort (1969) argued that technological change will generate merger waves. Evidence
since then has shown that mergers and takeovers play a reallocative role for an econ-
omy￿s stock of human and physical capital. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987), McGuckin
and Ngyen (1995) and Schoar (2002) ￿nd that the productivity of a target ￿rm rises
following a takeover. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002b, 2002c) study the trade-oﬀ be-
tween exits and acquisitions at the margin for an economy that needs to update its
capital stock. This last pair of papers shows that, at times when the value of organi-
zation capital is high, ￿rms are more likely to place themselves on the merger market
than to disassemble and sell their assets. Further, reallocation of assets among ￿rms
in general (i.e., by merger, consolidation, or purchases of unbundled used capital) is
more likely to occur than purchases of new capital when ￿rms need to make large
adjustments to their capital stocks because of ￿xed costs associated with entering the
merger market. We believe that both of these conditions are likely to hold during
times of sweeping technological change.
The U-shaped top line of Figure 19 is our estimate of the total amount of capital
that has been reallocated on the U.S. stock market from 1890 to 2003. Its components
are the stock market capitalization of entering and exiting ￿rms divided by two, and
the value of merger targets.17 Entries and exits divided by two, given by the center
line, is a rough measure of how much capital exits from the stock market and comes
back in under diﬀerent ownership, or at least under a diﬀerent name.18 The lower
line is the stock-market value of merger targets. Regardless of whether reallocation
o c c u r st h r o u g hm e r g e r so rt h r o u g he n t r ya n de x i t ,i ti sm u c hm o r ep r e v a l e n td u r i n g
the periods that we associate with Electri￿cation and IT.
17We identify targets for 1926-2003 using the CRSP stock ￿les and various supplementary sources.
CRSP itself identi￿es 9,758 ￿rms that exited the database by merger between 1926 and 2003. We
collected information on all mergers for 1895-1930 in the manufacturing and mining sectors from
the original worksheets underlying Nelson (1959), and identi￿ed mergers from 1885 to 1894 from the
￿nancial news section of weekly issues of the Commercial and Financial Chronicle. The resulting
target series includes the market values of 10,788 exchange-listed ￿rms in the year prior to their
acquisition. Stock market capitalizations are from our extension of CRSP backward to 1885 (see
footnote 13). Before assigning a ￿rm that no longer carries a price in our database as an ￿exit,￿
we check the list of hostile takeovers from Schwert (2000) for 1975-1996 and individual issues of the
Wall Street Journal from 1997-2003 to ensure that we record ￿rms taken private under a hostile
tender oﬀe r sa sm e r g e r s .
18For this to be exactly true, of course, would require that the assets of all ￿rms exiting the stock
market be purchased by new ￿rms that ended up listing on one of the major exchanges, and that
the capital stocks of these new ￿rms consist of only these used assets, assumptions that we know
to be violated in practice. If the quantity of assets that do not return to the stock market through
entry is roughly the same as the quantity of assets brought into the stock market by new entrants
that are not associated with exiting ￿rms, however, our measure would be roughly correct.


















Figure 19: Reallocated capital and its components as percentages of stock market
value, 1890-2003.
3.4 Stock prices should fall
The value of old capital should fall suddenly if the arrival of the GPT is a surprise,
as in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2002a), and Laitner and Stolyarov (2003), or more gradually as in Helpman
and Trajtenberg (1998a, 1998b). Figure 20 shows that the stock market declined in
1973-74.19 No such sudden drop is visible for stock prices in the early 1890s. Why not?
Maybe because the market was thin and unrepresentative in those days, with railway
stocks absorbing a large share of market capitalization. More likely, the realization
that the new technology would work well was more gradual and not prompted by any
19We obtain the composite stock price index at the end of each year from Wilson and Jones (2002),
updating through November 2004 using various issues of the Wall Street Journal.W ed e ￿ate using
the CPI.
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Figure 20: The real Cowles/S&P stock price index across the two GPT-eras.
single event such as the activation of the Pearl Street power station in 1882 or the
completion of the Niagara Falls dam in 1894.
In other words, perhaps a decline in the stock market did not occur early in the
Electri￿cation period because the events of the early 1890s were foreseen, as would
be the case in Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998a, 1998b). It also could be, as in
Boldrin and Levine (2001), that old capital is essential to the production of new
capital and that its value may not fall in quite the way that it would when capital
can be produced from consumption goods alone, as is the case in many growth models
including Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a).
If stock-price declines were caused by the threat of IT to incumbents, this should
relate especially to those sectors that later invested heavily in IT. Hobijn and Jo-
vanovic (2001,p .1218) con￿rm this using regression analysis.
3.5 Young ￿rms should do better
If new technologies are brought to market most eﬀectively by new ￿rms, we would
expect younger ￿rms in general to perform better than older ￿rms during the eras of
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Figure 21: Average age (in years) of the largest ￿rms whose market values sum to 5
percent of GDP, 1885-2001.
GPT adoption. The evidence on this hypothesis turns out to be mixed, but positive
overall.
3.5.1 The age of the leadership
As a GPT takes hold, we should not only expect to see ￿rms coming to market more
quickly, but the market leaders getting younger as well. In other words, every stage
in the lifetime of the ￿rm should be shorter. This stands in contrast to Hopenhayn
(1982), in which the age distribution of an industry￿s leadership is invariant when
an industry is in a long-run stochastic equilibrium. That is, the average age of, say,
the top 5 percent or top 10 percent of ￿rms is ￿xed. Some leaders hold on to their
positions and this tends to make the leading group older, but others are replaced by
younger ￿rms, and this has the opposite eﬀect. In equilibrium the two forces oﬀset
one another and the age of the leadership stays the same. Keeping the age of the
leaders ￿at requires, in other words, constant replacement.
Figures 21 and 22 plot the value-weighted average age of the largest ￿rms whose
market values sum to 5 and 10 percent of GDP, respectively. A ￿rm￿s ￿age￿ is
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Figure 22: Average age (in years) of the largest ￿rms whose market values sum to 10
percent of GDP, 1885-2001.
measured as the number of years since incorporation and since being listed on a
major stock exchange. We label some important entries and exits from this group in
Figure 21 (with exits denoted by ￿X￿). The two ￿gures show that, overall, the age of
the leaders is anything but ￿at. It sometimes rises faster than the 450 line, indicating
that the age of the leaders is rising faster than the passage of time. At other times it
is ￿at or falling, indicating replacement.
Based upon years from incorporation, for example, the leading ￿rms were being
replaced by older ￿rms over the ￿rst 30 years of our sample, because the solid line
is then steeper than the 45 ◦ line. In the two decades after the Great Depression the
leaders held their relative positions as the 45 ◦ slopes of the average age lines show.
The leaders got younger in the 1990s, and their average ages now lie well below the
45 ◦ line.20 Both ￿gures show, however, that the lines are ￿at or falling during the
20The volatility in these series derives not from aggregate stock-market volatility, but from the
volatility of individual ￿rm valuations. The large dip and subsequent recovery in both series in
1999-2001, for example, comes from Microsoft￿s enormous price appreciation in 1999, when it was
worth more than 5 percent of GDP on its own, and its rapid decline in 2000, which transferred the
32Year of listing














Figure 23: Waiting times to exchange listing, 1890-2003.
Electricity and IT periods, so that replacement at these times was high. This is best
seen in Figure 22.
3.5.2 The age of ￿rms at their IPO
According to the third ￿innovation-spawning￿ characteristic, when a GPT arrives it
gives rise to new projects that are unusually pro￿table. When such projects arrive,
￿rms will be more impatient to implement them. When it is new ￿rms that come
upon such projects (rather than incumbents), they will feel the pressure to list sooner.
This argument is developed and tested in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001b). We argue
there that the Electricity and IT-era ￿rms entered the stock market sooner because
the technologies that they brought in were too productive to be kept out of the market
for very long.
Figure 23 shows HP-￿ltered average waiting times from founding, ￿rst product
or process innovation, and incorporation to exchange listing based upon individual
company histories and our backward extension of the CRSP database.21 The vertical
full 5 percent share to GE. The two ￿rms split the 5 percent share in 2001.
21Listing years after 1925 are those for which ￿rms enter CRSP. For 1890-1924, they are years
33distance between the solid and dotted lines shows that ￿rms often have their ￿rst
innovation soon after founding, but that it then takes years, even decades, to list on
a stock exchange.22 We interpret this delay as a period during which the ￿rm and
possibly its lenders learn about what the ￿rm￿s optimal investment should be. But
when the technology is highly innovative, the incentive to wait is reduced and the
￿rm lists earlier, which is what the evidence shows.
Table 4 lists the ￿rst product or process innovation for some of the better-known
companies, along with their dates of founding, incorporation, and stock exchange
listing. It also includes the share of total market capitalization that can be attributed
to each ￿rm￿s common stock at the end of 2003. The ￿rms appearing in the table
separate into roughly 3 groups: those based upon electricity and internal combustion,
those based upon chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and those based upon the computer
and internet. Let us consider a few of the entries more closely:
￿ Electricity/Internal Combustion Engine: Two of largest companies in the United
States today are General Electric (GE) and AT&T. Founded in 1878, GE ac-
counted for 2.1 percent of total stock market value at the end of 2003, and had
already established a share of over 2 percent by 1910. AT&T, founded in 1885,
contributed 4.6 percent to total market value by 1928, and more than 8.5 per-
cent at the time of its forced breakup in 1984. Both were early entrants of the
Electricity era. GE￿s founding was based upon the invention of the incandes-
cent light bulb in 1879, while AT&T established a long-distance telephone line
from New York to Chicago in 1892 to make use of Bell￿s 1876 invention of the
telephone. Both technologies represented quantum leaps in the modernization
of industry and communications, and both ￿rms brought these technologies to
the NYSE about 15 years after founding. General Motors (GM) was an early
entrant to the automobile industry, listing on the NYSE in 1917￿n i n ey e a r s
after its founding. By 1931 it accounted for more than 4 percent of stock market
value, and its share would hover between 4 and 6.5 percent until 1965, when it
began to decline gradually to its share in 2003 of only 0.2 percent. These exam-
ples suggest that many of the leading entrants at the turn of the 20th century
created lasting market value. Further, the ideas that sparked their emergence
were brought to market relatively quickly.
in which prices ￿rst appear in the NYSE listings of The Annalist, Bradstreet￿s, The Commercial
and Financial Chronicle,o rThe New York Times. The 6,632 incorporation dates used to construct
Figure 23 are from Moody￿s Industrial Manual (1920, 1928, 1955, 1980), Standard and Poor￿s Stock
Market Encyclopedia (1981, 1988, 2000), and various editions of Standard and Poor￿s Stock Reports.
The 4,221 foundings are from Dun and Bradstreet￿s Million Dollar Directory (2003), Moody￿s, Etna
M. Kelley (1954), and individual company websites. The 482 ￿rst innovations were obtained by
reading company histories in Hoover￿s Online (2000) and company websites. We linearly interpolate
the series between missing points before applying the HP-￿l t e rt ot h et i m es e r i e si nF i g u r e2 3 .
22Figure 23 includes several years in the 1970s and early 1980s for which it appears that the
a v e r a g et i m ef r o m￿rst innovation to listing exceeds that from founding to listing. This is a result
of diﬀerences in the sample sizes used to construct each line.
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Table 4
Key Dates in Selected Company Histories













General Electric 1878 1880 1892 1892  2.09 
A T & T 1885 1892 1885 1901 0.11
Detroit Edison 1886 1904 1903 1909 0.04
General Motors 1908 1912 1908 1917 0.20
Coca Cola 1886 1893 1919 1919 0.83
Pacific Gas & Electic 1879 1879 1905 1919 0.08
Burroughs/Unisys 1886 1886 1886 1924 0.03
Caterpillar 1869 1904 1925 1929 0.19
Kimberly-Clark 1872 1914 1880 1929 0.20
Procter & Gamble 1837 1879 1890 1929 0.87
Bristol-Myers Squibb 1887 1903 1887 1933 0.37
Boeing 1916 1917 1916 1934 0.23
Pfizer 1849 1944 1900 1944 1.81
Merck 1891 1944 1934 1946 0.69
Disney 1923 1929 1940 1957 0.32
Hewlett Packard 1938 1938 1947 1961 0.47
McDonalds 1948 1955 1965 1966 0.21
Intel 1968 1971 1969 1972 1.40
Microsoft 1975 1980 1981 1986 1.99
America Online 1985 1988 1985 1992 0.52
Amazon 1994 1995 1994 1997 0.14
E-Bay 1995 1995 1996 1998 0.28
Data from Hoover’s Online, Kelley (1954), and company websites.       
The first major products or innovations for the firms listed in the table are: GE 1880, Edison patents
incandescent light bulb; AT&T 1892, completes phone line from New York to Chicago; DTE 1904,
increases Detroit’s electric capacity six-fold with new facilities; GM 1912, electric self-starter; Coca
Cola 1893, patents soft-drink formula; PG&E 1879, first electric utility; Burroughs/Unisys 1886, first
adding machine; CAT 1904, gas driven tractor; Kimberly-Clark 1914, celu-cotton, a cotton substitute
used in WWI; P&G 1879, Ivory soap; Bristol-Myers Squibb 1903, Sal Hepatica, a laxative mineral salt;
Boeing 1917, designs Model C seaplane; Pfizer 1944, deep tank fermentation to mass produce penicillin;
Merck 1944, cortisone (first steroid); Disney 1929, cartoon with soundtrack; HP 1938, audio oscillator;
McDonalds 1955, fast food franchising begins; Intel 1971, 4004 microprocessor (8088 microprocessor
in 1978); Microsoft 1980, develops DOS; AOL 1988, "PC-Link"; Amazon 1995, first online bookstore;
E-Bay 1995, first online auction house.  ￿ Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals: Procter and Gamble (P&G), Bristol-Myers-Squibb
and P￿zer are both leaders in their respective industries, but took much longer
to list on the NYSE than the Electri￿cation-era ￿rms. In fact, P&G and P￿zer
were established before 1850, and thus predate all of them. Despite P&G￿s early
start and the creation of the Ivory soap brand in 1879, it was not until 1932 that
the company took its place among the largest U.S. ￿rms by exploiting advances
in radio transmission to sponsor the ￿rst ￿soap opera.￿ P￿zer￿s de￿ning moment
came when it developed a process for mass-producing the breakthrough drug
penicillin during World War II, and the good reputation that the ￿rm earned
at that time later helped it to become the main producer of the Salk and Sabin
polio vaccines. In P￿zer￿s case, like that of P&G, the company￿s management
a n dc u l t u r eh a db e e ni np l a c ef o rs o m et i m ew h e nan e wt e c h n o l o g y( i nP ￿zer￿s
case antibiotics) presented a great opportunity.
￿ Computer/IT: Firms at the core of the recent IT revolution, such as Intel,
Microsoft, and Amazon, came to market shortly after founding. Intel listed in
1972, only four years after starting up, and accounted for 1.4 percent of total
stock market value at the end of 2003. Microsoft took eleven years to go public.
Conceived in an Albuquerque hotel room by Bill Gates in 1975, the company,
with its new disk operating system (MS-DOS), was perhaps ahead of its time,
but later joined the ranks of today￿s corporate giants with the proliferation of
the PC. In 1998, Microsoft accounted for more than 2.5 percent of the stock
market, but this share fell to 1.5 percent over the next two years in the midst
of antitrust action. By the end of 2003 its share had recovered somewhat to
nearly 2 percent of the stock market. Amazon caught the internet wave from
t h eo u t s e tt ob e c o m et h ew o r l d ￿ s￿rst on-line bookstore, going public in 1997
￿ only three years after its founding. As the complexities of integrating goods
distribution with an internet front-end came into sharper focus over the ensuing
years, however, and as competition among internet retailers continued to grow,
Amazon￿s market capitalization by 2003 had fallen to 0.14 percent of total stock
market value.
These ￿rms, as well as the others listed in Table 4, are ones that brought new
technologies into the stock market and accounted for more than 13 percent of its value
at the close of 2003. The ￿rms themselves also seem to have entered the stock market
sooner during the Electricity and IT eras, at opposite ends of the 20th century, than
￿rms based on mid-century technologies.
When ￿rms gather less information before investing, the investments that they
undertake will be riskier. One may conjecture that if new entrants waited less be-
fore investing during the GPT-eras, then incumbents also undertook projects earlier
than they would have normally. In these cases, the resulting investments would be
riskier than if more time were allowed to plan them. Moreover, the newness of the
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Figure 24: Nominal interest rate spreads between riskier and safer bonds, 1885-2003.
GPT would add further risk. On all these grounds, we would expect interest rate
diﬀerentials on the average investment to be higher in the GPT-eras.
Figure 24, which shows the spread between interest rates on riskier and safe in-
vestments since 1885, shows that this has been for the most part the case.23 It is
important to note that we formed the series in Figure 24 by joining three diﬀerent
spreads together, and that the ￿safe￿ asset is a long-term U.S. government bond be-
fore 1920 and a short-term U.S. Treasury bill thereafter, yet the ￿uctuations in this
series should still re￿ect risk perceptions reasonably well, at least to the extent that
term premia rather than riskiness are the main factors that lead to yield diﬀerentials
23In Figure 24, we use the spread between the interest rates on Baa-rated corporate bonds (from
Moody￿s Investors Service) and three-month T-bills [from the FRED database for 1934-2003 and
the Board of Governors (1976) for 1920-34] for the period from 19 2 0t ot h ep r e s e n t .F o r1900-20, we
join the spread between the interest rate on prime commercial paper with 60-90 days until maturity
[Homer and Sylla (1991, table 49, p. 358)] and the redemption yields on the U.S. government consol
2s of 1930 [Homer and Sylla (1991, table 46, p. 343)] with the Baa - T-bill spread. Finally, for
1885-99, we join the spread between the commercial paper rate [Homer and Sylla (1991, table 44, p.
320)] and the redemption yields on U.S. government refunding 4s of 1907 [Homer and Sylla (1991,
table 43, p. 316)] with the previous result.












Figure 25: Percent of rated corporate bond oﬀerings with Moody￿s ratings of A or
lower and Ba or lower, four-year averages, 1908-1965.
among the various government securities.
During the Electri￿cation period, spreads rose between 1894 and 1907, which
is when uncertainty about the usefulness and possibilities for adoption of the new
technology was greatest. Spreads fell after that as the future of Electricity became
clearer. In the IT-era, spreads have a generally-upward trend throughout, though
they did fall for a while in the late 1990s. This may well re￿ect the lag in the
widespread adoption of IT. The spread￿s sharp rise in 1930 and very slow decline over
the next 15 years probably has to do with the macroeconomic instability induced by
events prior to and during the Great Depression, and then the heavy borrowing by
the U.S. government to ￿nance World War II, which raised rates on T-bills.
Another measure of risk perceptions can be obtained from the distribution of
ratings for issues of new corporate bonds. Figure 25 uses data from Hickman (1958,
pp. 153-4) and Atkinson (1967, p. 97) for the period from 1908-65 to show four-year
averages, starting at the dates shown on the horizontal axis, of the percent of the
total par value of rated new corporate bond issues that received a Moody￿s rating of
single-A or lower and Ba or lower. In other words, the solid line excludes the highest
38rated bonds (i.e., classes Aaa and Aa), but includes some investment grade bonds
(i.e., A and Baa) along with the sub-investment grades (i.e., Ba and lower). The
dashed line includes only the sub-investment grades.
The dashed line in Figure 25 indicates that sub-investment grade bonds made
up a larger part of the value of total rated new issues during the Electri￿cation era
than after the start of the Great Depression, and though these data end in 1965, we
note that sub-investment grade issues began to rise again only on the eve of the IT
revolution in the mid-1960s. The solid line shows that issues of bonds not receiving
the highest Moody￿s ratings actually rose during the latter part of the Electri￿cation
era, peaking in the 1924-27 period, which was when a host of Electricity-related
innovations and appliances were being brought to market. This does not imply an
increase in junk-bond issuance at this time, but rather is consistent with the view
that investors recognized the risks involved with large-scale use of the new technology
and were a bit more cautious about overpaying for debt securities associated with it.
3.5.3 The stock market performance of the young vs. old after entry
Young ￿rms are smaller. If ￿creative destruction￿ does indeed mean that old ￿rms
give way to young ￿rms, then we should see signs of it in Figure 26, which depicts
t h er e l a t i v ea p p r e c i a t i o no ft h etotal market value of small versus large ￿rms since
1885.24 We de￿ne ￿small￿ ￿rms as those in the lower quintile of CRSP, and ￿large￿
￿rms as those in the upper quintile. The regression line in Figure 26 (with t-statistics
in parentheses) shows small ￿rms outperforming large ones in the long run and an
annual growth premium of about 7.5 percent. But the two GPT-eras do not show a
faster rise in relative appreciations than other times, and this is puzzling. Surprisingly,
recessions do not seem to hurt the long-term prospects of small ￿rms: The relative
index rises in 10 of the 23 NBER recessions.
T h et w op e r i o d st h a tw ew i s ht of o c u so na r e1929-31 and the early 1970s. In
both periods, the small-capitalization ￿rms lost out relative to the large-capitalization
ones. The ￿rst period comes at the end of the Electri￿cation era and the relative
decline of smaller ￿rms is what one would have expected. But the early 1970s come
at the beginning of a new GPT, and small ￿rms should have outperformed the large
￿rms at that time. Yet the opposite happened. It is only after 1974 that the small-
capitalization ￿rms start to perform better.
Regression evidence on age and stock-market performance.￿If the GPT is brought
in by young ￿rms, then the capital loss imposed by the GPT￿s arrival should fall more
heavily on old ￿rms. To test this using data on individual ￿rms, let
Ai = age since listing of ￿rm i in 1970.
24Being a total value index, this diﬀers from the relative stock price index that is plotted in Figure
8 of Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001). For the post-1925 period, in which they overlap, the qualitative
behavior of the two series is essentially the same.
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Figure 26: The relative capital appreciations of small vs. large ￿rms, 1885-2001.
Si = share (in ￿rm i￿s sector) of IT capital in the capital stock in 2001.
This measures a ￿rm￿s exposure to the impact of the new technology within its sector.
We use the change in a ￿rm￿s stock price over intervals that start in 1971 and end in
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995 as measures of expected performance. These should
re￿ect the market￿s assessment of how well the ￿rm will handle the consequences of






= c0+c1Ai + c2Si − c3AiSi.
We summarize the ￿rm-level results in Table 5.
The interaction between the ￿rm￿s age (A) and its exposure to the new technology
(S) is negative and signi￿cant only when the period during which we measure price
appreciation extends to 1990 and 1995. We would have expected this coeﬃcient to
be negative always, since older ￿rms in sectors where IT would become important
would be less able to adjust to the new technology than newer ￿rms. The interaction
40term has a positive coeﬃcient for the 1971-75, 1971-80, and 1971-85 periods, but it is
statistically signi￿cant only for the 1971-75 period. It thus seems that IT ￿rms took
a long time to realize gains in the market after the technology￿s arrival. There are
not very many ￿rms with continuous price data prior to 1900, but we have enough
Table 5
Age and stock market performance
Dependent variable: ln(Pt+i/Pt)
1971-75 1971-80 1971-85 1971-90 1971-95
constant -0.737 -0.143 0.152 -0.057 0.577
(-24.3) (-2.96) (2.58) (-0.59) (6.06)
A 0.007 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -.002
(6.40) (-0.46) (-0.55) (0.97) (-0.51)
S -3.497 -2.266 -1.035 -0.602 2.719
(-7.60) (-3.37) (-1.20) (-0.46) (1.88)
A ∗ S 0.047 0.043 -0.016- 0 . 122 -0.106
(2.22) (1.14) (-0.39) (-2.09) (-1.76)
R2 .089 .009 .003 .006 .012
N 2218 1814 1367 981 843
Note: The table presents coeﬃcient estimates for the sub-
periods included in the column headings with T-statistics in
parentheses. The R2 and number of observations (N) for
each regression appear in the ￿nal two rows.
















with t-statistics in parentheses and R2 = .015,N=5 6 . In this very small sample, we
do not see a direct eﬀect of age on capital depreciation as Electri￿cation got underway,
and the interaction term is not statistically signi￿cant.
3.6 Consumption, interest rates and the trade de￿cit
If it is unanticipated, the arrival of a GPT is good news for the consumer because it
brings about an increase in wealth. How quickly wealth is perceived to rise depends
on how quickly the public realizes the GPT￿s potential for raising output. The rise
in wealth would raise desired consumption. But to implement the GPT ￿rms would
also need to increase their investment. Therefore aggregate demand would rise and,
in a small open economy this would lead to a trade de￿cit. In a closed economy, on
the other hand, since income does not immediately rise, the rise in aggregate demand
41would cause the rate of interest to rise so that the rise in aggregate demand would
be postponed.
How much consumption rises depends on two factors. The ￿rst is the GPT￿s
pervasiveness worldwide ￿ if the entire world is equally aﬀe c t e dt h e nc o n s u m p t i o n
could not rise right away and the main eﬀects would be transmitted though the rate
of interest. The second is the openness of the U.S. economy. Even if, say, the United
States were the only country aﬀected by the GPT, the rise in consumption would be
related to how easily capital could ￿ow in.
In these respects, the IT episode diﬀers from the Electri￿cation episode in several
important respects. Capital in￿ows into the United States simply were not in the
cards during a large part of the Electri￿cation episode. World War I exhausted the
European nations and the United States could not borrow from the rest of the world
to ￿nance its electri￿cation-led expansion ￿ it was instead a creditor during this
period. Moreover, even if the War had not taken place, it is not clear whether the
United States could have borrowed much from the rest of the world because Britain,
Germany, France, and several other countries were undergoing the same process ￿
Electri￿cation was more synchronized across the developed world than IT has so far
been.
In sum, we would expect the United States to have behaved more like a closed
economy during the Electri￿cation Era and more like a small open economy during
the IT Era. Speci￿cally, we would expect to see
1. A larger rise in the trade de￿cit during the IT era than during the Electri￿cation
era,
2. A smaller rise in consumption during the Electri￿cation era then during the IT
era,
3. A larger rise in the rate of interest during the Electri￿cation era.
3.6.1 The trade de￿cit
Figure 27 plots the trade de￿cit as a percentage of GNP since 1790 along with an
H-P trend, shows sharply-rising trade de￿cits at the start of the IT revolution, though
not in the early years of Electri￿cation.25.T h e t r a d e d e ￿cit indeed opens up fairly
dramatically during the IT era and, whereas during the Electri￿cation era we see a
surplus. As we mentioned, this surplus was driven by the various Colonial wars that
took place at the turn of the century and, of course, by World War I.
25GDP and total imports and exports of goods and services are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2004) for 1929-2003. For 1790-1920, imports and exports are from Bureau of Census
(1975), series U-8 and U-1, p. 864, respectively), and the GDP series are from Kendrick (1961)a n d
Berry (1988).













Figure 27: The trade de￿c i ta sap e r c e n to fG D P ,1790-2003.
3.6.2 The consumption-income ratio
We expected to see a smaller rise in consumption during the Electri￿cation era than
during the IT era, and after we adjust for the downward long-run trend, this is
indeed what has happened. Private consumption rises gradually during each GPT-
era, and this is set against a long-run secular trend for private consumption that is
negative. Figure 28 shows the ratio of consumption to GDP since 1790.26 As our
GPT hypotheses would suggest, the arrival of Electricity in 1890 seems to mark the
end of a long-term decline in the ratio that been underway for a century. And though
the level of the series falls during the Great Depression and World War II, never to
return to its pre-1930 levels, consumption takes another sharp upward turn near the
26The series for consumption and GDP are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) for
1929-2003, Kendrick (1961, table A-IIb, cols. 4 and 11, pp. 296-97) for 1889-1929, and Berry (1988,
table 9, pp. 25-26) for 1790-1889. The BEA ￿gures are for personal consumption, but the Kendrick
and Berry ￿gures include the government sector as well. Since consumption in the government sector
was much smaller prior to World War I, we suspect that the downward trend in the 19th century is a
result of changing private consumption patterns rather than a reduction in the government sector￿s
consumption.










Figure 28: The ratio of consumption to income, 1790-2003.
start of the IT revolution and continues to rise.
3.6.3 Interest rates
We expected a larger rise in the rate of interest during the Electri￿cation Era than
during the IT era. Relative to HP trends, the evidence is not favorable. Figure 29
shows that ex-post real interest rates were about the same during the two GPT-eras,
and much lower in the middle 40 unshaded years of the 20th century.27 The dashed
line is the H-P detrended series. The averages are
Era Ex-post real interest rate
1870 − 1893 7.78
1894 − 1930 2.61
1931 − 1970 − 0.16
1971 − 2003 2.75
27Commercial paper rates are annual averages from the FRED database for 1934-2003 and from
Homer and Sylla (1991) for earlier years. We compute the ex-post return by subtracting in￿ation
as computed by the growth of the implicit price de￿ator for GNP from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2004) for 1929-2003 and Berry (1988) for earlier years.
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Figure 29: The ex-post real interest rate on commercial paper, 1870-2003.
We note that the ex-post rate is quite high in the ￿rst era, before 1894. If the arrival
of electricity and its impact was foreseen prior to 1894, interest rates would have risen
earlier, but this probably does not explain why it was so high then. More likely, the
pre-1894 era re￿ects a lack of ￿nancial development: The stock market was small
then, and the ￿nancial market not as deep. This may have given rise to an overall
negative trend in interest rates over the 134-year period as a whole.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Technological invention is uneven, and comes in bursts; that much has for a long
time been clear to students of growth. Electricity and IT are, to most observers, the
two most important GPTs to date, or at least they seem so according to the three
criteria that Bresnahan and Trajtenberg proposed. In this chapter we have analyzed
how the U.S. economy reacted to the creation of these two GPTs. Having discussed
in detail GPTs with reference to the Electri￿cation and IT eras, we believe that we
have shown that the concept is a good way to organize how we think of technological
change and its eﬀects.
45The Electricity and IT eras diﬀer in some important ways. Electri￿cation was
more broadly adopted, whereas IT seems to be technologically more revolutionary.
The productivity slowdown is stronger in the IT era but the ongoing spread of IT
and its continuing precipitous price decline are reasons for optimism about growth
in the coming decades relative to what happened in the middle of the 20th century
following the spread of Electricity. But it is the similarities between the two epochs
that are the most instructive and that will guide our expectations about how the next
GPT will aﬀect economic life when it comes along.
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